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Abstract
Many hard computational social choice problems are known to become tractable
when voters’ preferences belong to a restricted domain, such as those of single-
peaked or single-crossing preferences. However, to date, all algorithmic results of
this type have been obtained for the setting where each voter’s preference list is a
total order of candidates. The goal of this paper is to extend this line of research to
the setting where voters’ preferences are dichotomous, i.e., each voter approves
a subset of candidates and disapproves the remaining candidates. We propose
several analogues of the notions of single-peaked and single-crossing preferences
for dichotomous profiles and investigate the relationships among them. We then
demonstrate that for some of these notions the respective restricted domains admit
efficient algorithms for computationally hard approval-based multi-winner rules.
1 Introduction
Preference aggregation is a fundamental problem in social choice, which has recently
received a considerable amount of attention from the AI community. In particular,
an important research question in computational social choice (Brandt et al., 2015) is
the complexity of computing the output of various preference aggregation procedures.
While for most common single-winner rules winner determination is easy, many at-
tractive rules that output a committee (a fixed-size set of winners) or a ranking of the
candidates are known to be computationally hard.
There are several ways to circumvent these hardness results, such as using ap-
proximate and parameterized algorithms. These standard algorithmic approaches are
complemented by an active stream of research that analyzes the computational com-
plexity of voting rules on restricted preference domains, such as the classic domains
of single-peaked (Black, 1958) or single-crossing (Mirrlees, 1971) preferences. This
research direction was popularized by Walsh (2007) and Faliszewski et al. (2011), and
has lead to a number of efficient algorithms for winner determination under prominent
voting rules as well as for manipulation and control, which can be used when voters’
preferences belong to one of these restricted domains (Walsh, 2007; Faliszewski et al.,
∗A preliminary version appeared in the proceedings of IJCAI 2015, the International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (Elkind and Lackner, 2015).
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2011; Brandt et al., 2010; Faliszewski et al., 2014; Betzler et al., 2013; Skowron et al.,
2015b; Magiera and Faliszewski, 2014).
To the best of our knowledge, this line of work only considers settings where vot-
ers’ preferences are given by total orders over the set of candidates; indeed, this is
perhaps the most widely studied setting in the area of computational social choice.
However, computationally complex preference aggregation problems may also arise
when voters’ preferences are dichotomous, i.e., each voter approves a subset of the
candidates and disapproves the remaining candidates. Committee selection rules for
voters with dichotomous preferences, or approval-based rules, have recently attracted
some attention from the computational social choice community, and for two promi-
nent such rules (specifically, Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) (Kilgour and Mar-
shall, 2012) and Maximin Approval Voting (MAV) (Brams et al., 2007)) computing
the winning committee is known to be NP-hard (Aziz et al., 2015a; LeGrand et al.,
2007). It is therefore natural to ask if one could identify a suitable analogue of single-
peaked/single-crossing preferences for the the dichotomous setting, and design effi-
cient algorithms for approval-based rules over such restricted dichotomous preference
domains.
To address this challenge, in this paper we propose and explore a number of domain
restrictions for dichotomous preferences that build on the same intuition as the concepts
of single-peakedness and single-crossingness. Some of our restricted domains are de-
fined by embedding voters or candidates into the real line, and requiring that the voters’
preferences over the candidates “respect” this embedding; others are obtained by view-
ing dichotomous preferences as weak orders and requiring them to admit a refinement
that has a desirable structural property. Surprisingly, these approaches lead to a large
number of concepts that are pairwise non-equivalent and capture different aspects of
our intuition about what it means for preferences to be “one-dimensional”. We analyze
the relationships among these restricted preference domains, (see Figure 5 for a sum-
mary), and discuss the complexity of detecting whether a given dichotomous profile
belongs to one of these domains. We then demonstrate that considering these domains
is useful from the perspective of algorithm design, by providing polynomial-time and
FPT algorithms for PAV and MAV under some of these domain restrictions.
2 Basic Definitions
Let C = {c1, . . . , cm} be a finite set of candidates. A partial order  over C is a
reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive binary relation on C; a partial order  is said to
be total if for each c, d ∈ C we have c  d or d  c. We say that a partial order 
over C is a dichotomous weak order if C can be partitioned into two disjoint sets C+
and C− (one of which may be empty) so that c  d for each c ∈ C+, d ∈ C− and the
candidates within C+ and C− are incomparable under .
An approval vote on C is an arbitrary subset of C. We say that an approval vote
v is trivial if v = ∅ or v = C. A dichotomous profile P = (v1, . . . , vn) is a list of
n approval votes; we will refer to vi as the vote of voter i. We write vi = C \ vi.
We associate an approval vote vi with the dichotomous weak order vi that satisfies
c vi d if and only if c ∈ vi, d ∈ vi. Note that vi = ∅ and vi = C correspond to the
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same dichotomous weak order, namely the empty one.
A partial order ′ over C is a refinement of a partial order  over C if for every
c, d ∈ C it holds that c  d implies c ′ d. A profile P ′ = (1, . . . ,n) of total
orders is a refinement of a dichotomous profile P = (v1, . . . , vn) if i is a refinement
of vi for each i = 1, . . . , n.
Let C be a total order over C. A total order  over C is said to be single-peaked
with respect toC if for any triple of candidates a, b, c ∈ C with aC bC c or cC bCa it
holds that a  b implies b  c. A profile P of total orders over C is said to be single-
peaked if there exists a total order C over C such that all orders in P are single-peaked
with respect to C.
A profileP = (1, . . . ,n) of total orders overC is said to be single-crossing with
respect to the given order of votes if for every pair of candidates a, b ∈ C such that
a 1 b all votes where a is preferred to b precede all votes where b is preferred to a; P
is single-crossing if the votes in P can be permuted so that it becomes single-crossing
with respect to the resulting order of votes.
A profile P = (1, . . . ,n) of total orders over C is said to be 1-Euclidean if
there is a mapping ρ of voters and candidates into the real line such that c i d if and
only if |ρ(i)− ρ(c)| < |ρ(i)− ρ(d)|. A 1-Euclidean profile is both single-peaked and
single-crossing.
3 Preference Restrictions
We will now define a number of constraints that a dichotomous profile may satisfy.
Most of these constraints can be divided into two basic groups: those that are based
on ordering voters and/or candidates on the line and requiring the votes to respect this
order (this includes VEI, VI, CEI, CI, DE, and DUE), and those that are based on
viewing votes as weak orders and asking if there is a single-peaked/single-crossing/1-
Euclidean profile of total orders that refines the given profile (this includes PSP, PSC,
and PE); we remark that the study of the latter type of constraints was initiated by
Lackner (2014). We will also consider constraints that are based on partitioning vot-
ers/candidates (2PART and PART), as well as two constraints (WSC and SSC) that
have been introduced in a recent paper of Elkind et al. (2015) in order to understand
the best way of extending the single-crossing property to weak orders.
Fix a profile P = (v1, . . . , vn) over C.
1. 2-partition (2PART): We say that P satisfies 2PART if P contains only two dis-
tinct votes v, v′, and v ∩ v′ = ∅, v ∪ v′ = C.
2. Partition (PART): We say that P satisfies PART if C can be partitioned into pair-
wise disjoint subsets C1, . . . , C` such that {v1, . . . , vn} = {C1, . . . , C`} (i.e.,
each voter in P approves one of the sets C1, . . . , C`). Note that this constraint
contains as a special case profiles where every voter approves of exactly one
candidate.
3. Voter Extremal Interval (VEI): We say that P satisfies VEI if the voters in P can
be reordered so that for every candidate c the voters that approve c form a prefix
3
v6v5v4
b
c
v3v2v1
a d
Figure 1: Voter Extremal Interval
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Figure 2: Voter Interval
or a suffix of the ordering. Equivalently, both the voters who approve c and the
voters who disapprove c form an interval of that ordering. See Figure 1 for an
example.
4. Voter Interval (VI): We say that P satisfies VI if the voters in P can be reordered
so that for every candidate c the voters that approve c form an interval of that
ordering. See Figure 2 for an example.
Candidate Extremal Interval (CEI): We say that P satisfies CEI if candidates in
C can be ordered so that each of the sets vi forms a prefix or a suffix of that
ordering. Equivalently, both vi and vi form an interval of that ordering. See
Figure 3 for an example.
5. Candidate Interval (CI): We say that P satisfies CI if candidates in C can be
ordered so that each of the sets vi forms an interval of that ordering. See Figure 4
for an example.
6. Dichotomous Uniformly Euclidean (DUE): We say that P satisfies DUE if there
is a mapping ρ of voters and candidates into the real line and a radius r such that
for every voter i it holds that vi = {c : |ρ(i)− ρ(c)| ≤ r}.
7. Dichotomous Euclidean (DE): We say that P satisfies DE if there is a mapping ρ
of voters and candidates into the real line such that for every voter i there exists
a radius ri with vi = {c : |ρ(i)− ρ(c)| ≤ ri}.
8. Possibly single-peaked (PSP): We say that P satisfies PSP if there is a single-
peaked profile of total orders P ′ that is a refinement of P .
9. Possibly single-crossing (PSC): We say that P satisfies PSC if there is a single-
crossing profile of total orders P ′ that is a refinement of P .
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6
v1
v2
v3
v4
Figure 3: Candidate Extremal Interval
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6
v1
v4
v2
v3
Figure 4: Candidate Interval
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Figure 5: Relations between notions of structure. Dashed lines indicate that the respec-
tive containment holds only subject to additional conditions.
10. Possibly Euclidean (PE): We say that P satisfies PE if there is a 1-Euclidean
profile of total orders P ′ that is a refinement of P .
11. Seemingly single-crossing (SSC): We say that P satisfies SSC if the voters in P
can be reordered so that for each pair of candidates a, b ∈ C it holds that either
all votes vi with a ∈ vi, b 6∈ vi precede all votes vj with a 6∈ vj , b ∈ vj or vice
versa.
12. Weakly single-crossing (WSC): We say that P satisfies WSC if the voters in P
can be reordered so that for each pair of candidates a, b ∈ C it holds that each
of the vote sets V1 = {vi : a ∈ vi, b 6∈ vi}, V2 = {vi : a 6∈ vi, b ∈ vi},
V3 = {v ∈ P : v 6∈ V1 ∪ V2} forms an interval of this ordering, with V3
appearing between V1 and V2.
3.1 Relations
The relationships among the properties defined above are depicted in Figure 5, where
arrows indicate containment, i.e., more restrictive notions are at the top. All these
containments are strict.
The four arrows at the top level of the diagram are immediate: any profile with at
most two distinct votes where each candidate is approved in at least one of these votes
satisfies VEI, CEI and WSC, and by definition 2PART is a special case of PART.
To understand the arrows in the next level, we first characterize the dichotomous
profiles that are weakly single-crossing.
Lemma 1. A dichotomous profile P satisfies WSC if and only if there exist three votes
u, v, w such that
(1) for every vi ∈ P it holds that vi∈ {u,v,w}, and
(2) v is equal to either u∩w or u∪w.
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Proof sketch. It is easy to check that every profile satisfying (1)–(2) satisfies WSC. For
the converse direction, assume without loss of generality that the ordering of the votes
v1 @ v2 @ · · · @ vn witnesses that P satisfies WSC. Let u = v1, w = vn, and set
C1 = u ∩ w, C2 = u ∩ w, C3 = u ∩ w, C4 = u ∩ w. The WSC property implies
that for every ` = 1, 2, 3, 4, every a, b ∈ C`, and every vi ∈ P we have a ∈ vi if
and only if b ∈ vi, i.e., candidates in each C` occur as a block in all votes. Note that
v1 = u = C1 ∪ C2, vn = w = C1 ∪ C3.
Suppose that C1, C4 6= ∅. Then C1 ⊆ vi, C4 ⊆ vi for all vi ∈ P . Indeed, fix a pair
of candidates a ∈ C1, b ∈ C4. Both the first and the last voter strictly prefer a to b, and
therefore so do all other voters. Thus, if P contains a vote vi 6= u,w, it has to be the
case that vi = C1 = u ∩ w or vi = C1 ∪ C2 ∪ C3 = u ∪ w; moreover, if both of these
votes occur simultaneously and are distinct from each other and u,w (i.e., C2, C3 6= ∅),
the WSC property is violated. Indeed, suppose that vi = C1, vj = C1 ∪ C2 ∪ C3. Fix
candidates a ∈ C1, b ∈ C4. If vi appears before vj , consider a candidate c ∈ C2: we
get a contradiction as voters v1 and vj are indifferent between a and c, but vi strictly
prefers a to c. If vi appears after vj , consider a candidate d ∈ C3: we get a contradiction
as voters v1 and vi are indifferent between d and b, but vj strictly prefers d to b. When
C1 or C4 is empty, the analysis is similar; note, however, that trivial votes (vi = C and
vi = ∅) may alternate arbitrarily without violating the WSC property (this is why the
lemma is stated in terms of weak orders rather than approval votes).
We can now show that under mild additional conditions (no trivial voters/candidates)
WSC implies VEI and CEI.
Proposition 2. Let P be a dichotomous profile that either contains only two distinct
votes or contains no vote vi with vi = ∅. If P satisfies WSC, then it satisfies VEI.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that P satisfies WSC with respect to an or-
dering of voters v1 @ · · · @ vn, and let u = v1, w = vn. We will show that P satisfies
VEI with respect to @. If P only contains two distinct votes, this claim is immediate,
so assume that ∅ 6∈ P . Consider a vote v ∈ P that is distinct from u and w. Since
∅ 6∈ P , by Lemma 1 there exist i, j with 1 < i < j < n such that vk = u for k < i,
vk = v for k = i, . . . , j, vk = w for k > j, and v ∈ {u∪w, u∩w}. Suppose first that
v = u ∩ w. Then candidates in u ∩ w are approved by all voters, candidates in u \ w
are approved by the first i−1 voters, candidates in w \u are approved by the last n− j
voters, and the remaining candidates are not approved by anyone. On the other hand,
if v = u ∪ w, then candidates in u ∩ w are approved by all voters, candidates in u \ w
are approved by the first j voters, candidates in w \u are approved by the last n− i+1
voters, and the remaining candidates are not approved by anyone.
The condition that the profile must not contain ∅ is necessary: the profile ({a, b}, ∅, {b, c})
satisfies WSC, but not VEI.
Proposition 3. Let P be a dichotomous profile that either contains only two distinct
votes or in which every candidate is approved in at least one vote and disapproved in
at least one vote. If P satisfies WSC, then it satisfies CEI.
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Proof. Suppose that P is WSC with respect to some ordering of voters; let u and w
be, respectively, the first and the last vote in this ordering. If P contains a trivial vote,
it contains at most two non-trivial votes, in which case the claim is obvious. Thus,
assume that it contains no trivial votes. Then we have u ∩ w = ∅ (any candidate in
u ∩ w would be approved by all voters) and u ∩ w = ∅ (any candidate in u ∩ w would
be disapproved by all voters). It is now easy to see that ordering the candidates so that
all candidates approved by u precede all candidates approved by w witnesses that P is
CEI.
To see that conditions of Proposition 3 are necessary, consider the profile ({a, b}, {b, c})
over {a, b, c, d} and the profile ({a, b}, {b}, {b, c}) over {a, b, c}: both of these profiles
satisfy WSC, but not CEI.
Interestingly, requiring a dichotomous profile to satisy WSC, CEI and VEI simul-
taneously, turns out to be very demanding: we obtain 2-partition profiles.
Proposition 4. A dichotomous profile is WSC, CEI and VEI if and only if it is a 2-
partition.
Proof. It is immediate that a 2-partition profile is WSC, CEI, and VEI. For the converse
direction, let P be a CEI, VEI and WSC profile. By Lemma 1, P contains at most
three distinct votes u, v, w with v = u ∩ w or v = u ∪ w. Since P is CEI, we know
from Lemma 3 that every candidate is approved at least once. Hence u ∪ w = C.
Furthermore, every candidate is disapproved at least once. Thus, u ∩w = ∅, since this
intersection is also approved by v. Thus, v is a trivial vote. This is possible because
of Lemma 2 and hence v does not appear in P . We have shown that P is a 2-partition
profile.
Next, we will relate CEI and VEI to DUE.
Proposition 5. If a dichotomous profile P satisfies CEI or VEI, then it satisfies DUE.
Proof. Suppose first that P satisfies CEI with respect to the ordering c1 C · · · C cm
of candidates. Map the candidates into the real line by setting ρ(ci) = i, and let
r = m. We can now place each voter i to the left or to the right of all candidates at an
appropriate distance so that the set of candidates within distance r from him coincides
with vi. For VEI the argument is similar: if P satisfies VEI with respect to the ordering
v1 @ · · · @ vn of voters, we place voters on the real line according to ρ(i) = i, let
r = n, and place each candidate to the left or to the right of all voters at an appropriate
distance.
The proof that WSC implies DUE is also based on our characterization of WSC
preferences.
Proposition 6. If a dichotomous profile P satisfies WSC, then it satisfies DUE.
Proof. Clearly empty votes can be ignored when checking whether a profile satisfies
DUE, so assume P contains to empty votes. Then it contains at most three distinct
votes u, v, w with v = u ∩ w or v = u ∪ w. Set ρ(c) = 1 for c ∈ u \ w, ρ(c) = 2 for
c ∈ u∩w, ρ(c) = 3 for c ∈ w \u, ρ(c) = 10 for c 6∈ u∪w. We set r = 1 if v = u∩w
and r = 2 if v = u ∪ w, and position the voters accordingly.
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The last arrow on this level is from PART to DUE: here, the containment is straight-
forward, as the candidates approved by each voter can be placed as a block on the axis,
with the respective voter(s) placed in the center of this block.
Proposition 7. If a dichotomous profile P satisfies DUE then it satisfies both VI and
CI. The converse direction does not hold: there are profiles that satisfy VI and CI but
not DUE.
Proof. Since P satisfies DUE, we have an embedding ρ of votes and candidates into
the real line. For VI, we order voters as induced by the ρmapping; the voters approving
some candidate form an interval on this induced order. For CI, we order candidates as
induced by the ρ mapping; voters always approve a single interval on this ordering.
For showing that the converse direction does not hold, consider the profile ({a, b, c},
{b, c, d}, {b}, {c}). Towards a contradiction assume that ρ is a mapping of voters and
candidates into the real line that witnesses the DUE property for a fixed radius r. The
given profile satisfies CI only with respect to the orders aC bC cCd, aC cC bCd and
their reverses. Since the profile is symmetric with respect to a and d and with respect to
b and c, we can assume without loss of generality that ρ orders candidates as the order
aC bC cC d does. Then it has to hold that |ρ(a)− ρ(c)| ≤ r since a and c appear in
the same vote. However, due to the vote {b}, it also has to hold that |ρ(a)− ρ(c)| > r;
this is a contradiction.
We see that similar to total orders, where the intersection of the single-peaked and
the single-crossing domain is a strict subset of the 1-Euclidean domain (see discussion
in (Doignon and Falmagne, 1994; Elkind et al., 2014)), for dichotomous preferences
also VI intersected with CI does not yield DUE. The next results shows that the classes
of CI, DE, PSP and PE preferences coincide.
Proposition 8. Let P be a dichotomous profile. Then the following conditions are
equivalent: (a) P satisfies PE (b) P satisfies PSP (c) P satisfies CI (d) P satisfies DE.
Proof sketch. Suppose P satisfies PE, and let P ′ be a refinement of P that, together
with a mapping ρ, witnesses this. Then P ′ is single-peaked and therefore P satisfies
PSP. If P satisfies PSP, as witnessed by a refinement P ′ and an axis C, then P satisfies
CI with respect to C. If P satisfies CI with respect to an order C of candidates, we
can map the candidates into the real axis in the order suggested by C so that the dis-
tance between every two adjacent candidates is 1. We can then choose an appropriate
approval radius and position for each voter. Finally, if P satisfies DE, as witnessed by
a mapping ρ, we can use this mapping to construct a refinement of P; by construction,
this refinement is 1-Euclidean (we may have to modify ρ slightly to avoid ties).
Also, every PE profile is PSC since every 1-Euclidean refinement is also single-
crossing. Interestingly, the converse is not true.
Example 1. Consider the profile P = ({a, b}, {a, c}, {b, c}) over C = {a, b, c}. It
satisfies PSC, as witnessed by the single-crossing refinement (a  b  c, c  a 
b, c  b  a). However, in every refinement of P the first voter ranks c last, the second
voter ranks b last, and the third voter ranks a last. Thus, no such refinement can be
single-peaked, and, consequently, no such refinement can be 1-Euclidean.
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The equivalence between PSC and SSC is not entirely obvious: while it is clear that
a profile that violates SSC also violates PSC, to prove the converse one needs to use
an argument similar to the proof of Theorem 4 in (Elkind et al., 2015). This has been
shown in the extended version of (Elkind et al., 2015).
Proposition 9. If a dichotomous profile P satisfies VI, it also satisfies SSC.
Proof. Assume that an VI profile is not SSC. Since it is not SSC, for every ordering of
votes @ there are two candidates a  b and votes vi @ vj @ vk such that vi : a  b,
vj : b  a and vk : a  b. This implies, however, that for every @ there is a candidate
a and votes vi @ vj @ vk such that vi and vk approve of a and vj disapproves vj . This
contradicts our assumption that the given profile is VI.
We are now going to list the remaining counter-examples for containment and thus
show that the arrows in Figure 5 indeed indicate strict containment.
• CI6→VI: Consider ({a, b, c}, {a}, {b}, {c}). This profile is CI with respect to
a C b C c. It is not VI since the vote {abc} would have to be placed next to
{a}, {b}, {c}.
• VI 6→CI: Consider ({a, b}, {a, c}, {a, d}). This profile is VI for the given order
of voters. It is not CI since a has to lie next to b, c, d.
• VEI 6→CEI: Consider ({a, b}, {a, d}, {c, d}). This profile is VEI for the given
order of voters. It is not CEI since a has to lie next to b and d and c has to lie
next to d. So bC aC dC c is the only order witnessing CI, but the vote {a, d} is
not an extremal interval on this order.
• CEI 6→VEI: Consider ({a, b}, {a}, {c}, {b, c}). All votes are extremal intervals
on the order a C b C c. The profile is however not VEI since {a, b} has to lie
next to {a} and next to {bc} and {c} next to {bc}. So we obtain {c} @ {b, c} @
{a, b} @ {a} as the only order witnessing VI, but this order does not satisfy VEI
(consider candidate b).
• PART6→VEI, CEI, WSC: Consider the PART profile {a}, {b}, {c}.
All other counterexamples involving WSC immediately follow from Lemma 1 and
Proposition 2 and 3; all missing counterexamples involving PART can be obtained by
picking intersecting votes.
3.2 Unique orders
If voter’s preferences are given by total orders, single-crossing profiles have a unique
single-crossing order, i.e., only one specific order and its reverse witness the single-
crossing property of the profile. For single-peaked profiles (of total orders) this is
not the case. The question arises whether a similar phenomenon can be observed for
dichotomous profiles. Clearly, this question only makes sense for profiles with distinct
votes (for VI, VEI, WSC) and when all candidates are approved by some vote (for CI
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and CEI). Also, by unique we always mean that only one specific order and its reverse
witness a certain restriction.
For dichotomous profiles satisfying SC, there is no unique order. The profile
({a}, {a, b}, {b, c}) is SC and all votes that put {b, c} at an outermost position witness
the SC property. Also profiles satisfying VI or CI do not have unique orders witnessing
these properties; e.g., consider {}, {a}, {b} and {a}, {b}, {c}, respectively.
For profiles being WSC, VEI or CEI we can show that their corresponding orders
are indeed unique. For profiles satisfying WSC, this follows from Lemma 1; for profiles
satisfying either VEI or CEI the uniqueness can be shown as follows.
Lemma 10. For profiles containing distinct votes, VEI orders are unique.
Proof. Without loss of generality assume that 1 @ · · · @ n be a VEI order. Assume
towards a contradiction that @′ is another VEI order that is neither @ nor its reverse.
Consequently, there exist three votes vi, vj , vk, i < j < k for which@ and@′ disagree
on their order in the sense that vj is not in between vi and vk with respect to@′. Without
loss of generality let us assume j @′ i @′ k. Let us consider CX for every X ⊆
{i, j, k} being defined as the set of all candidates approved by the votes corresponding
to X but not approved by those corresponding to {i, j, k} \ X . For example, Cik are
those candidates approved by ci and ck but not by cj . Since we have a CEI profile and
i @ j @ k, we know that Cik = Cj = ∅. Under our assumption that @′ is also a
VEI ordering with j @′ i @′ k, we know that Cjk = Ci = ∅. This implies that the
candidate approved by ci are Cijk ∪Cij and those approved by cj are also Cijk ∪Cij .
This contradicts our assumption that all votes are distinct.
Lemma 11. If all candidates are approved by distinct sets of voters, CEI orders are
unique.
Proof. First, let us observe that two candidates that are approved by the same voters
certainly are indistinguishable; their positions on the CEI axis are interchangeable.
Thus, our condition is necessary for the lemma to hold. The proof of this statement
is similar to the previous proof. Without loss of generality assume that c1 C · · · C cm
be a CEI order. Assume towards a contradiction that C′ is another CEI order that is
neither C nor its reverse. Consequently, there exist three votes vi, vj , vk, i < j < k
for which C and C′ disagree on their order in the sense that cj is not in between ci
and ck with respect to C′. Without loss of generality let us assume cj C′ ci C′ ck.
Let us consider VX for every X ⊆ {i, j, k} being defined as the set of all votes that
approve the candidates in X and disapprove those in {i, j, k} \ X . Since we have a
VEI profile and ci C cj C ck, we know that Vik = Vj = ∅. Under our assumption that
C′ is also a CEI ordering with cj C′ ciC′ ck, we know that Vjk = Vi = ∅. This implies
that the votes that approve ci are Vijk ∪ Vij and the votes approving cj are Vijk ∪ Vij .
This contradicts our assumption that all candidates are approved by a distinct set of
voters.
3.3 Detection
To exploit the constraints defined in Section 3, we have developed algorithms that can
decide whether a given profile belongs to one of the restricted domains defined by these
10
constraint complexity
2PART poly (trivial)
PART poly (trivial)
VEI poly (CONSECUTIVE 1S)
CEI poly (CONSECUTIVE 1S)
WSC poly (Elkind et al., 2015)
DUE poly (Nederlof and Woeginger, 2015)
VI poly (CONSECUTIVE 1S)
CI=DE=PSP=PE poly (CONSECUTIVE 1S)
PSC=SSC open
Table 1: The complexity of detecting structure in dichotomous profiles
constraints. Our results are summarized in Table 1.
Clearly, verifying whether a given profile satisfies 2PART or PART is straightfor-
ward. For most of the remaining problems, we can proceed by a reduction to the
classic CONSECUTIVE 1S problem (Booth and Lueker, 1976). This problem asks if
the columns of a given 0-1 matrix can be permuted in such a way that in each row of
the resulting matrix the 1s are consecutive, i.e., the 1s form an interval in each row; it
admits a linear-time algorithm (Booth and Lueker, 1976).
Theorem 12. Detecting whether a dichotomous profile satisfies CEI, CI, VI or VEI is
possible in O(m · n) time.
Proof. Let C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} and P = (v1, v2, . . . , vn). We construct an instance
of CONSECUTIVE 1S in slightly different ways, depending on the property we want to
detect. In all cases, we obtain a “yes”-instance if and only if the given profile has the
desired property.
Let us start with CI. For each vote, we create one row of the matrix: for each i ∈ [n]
and j ∈ [m], the j-th entry of the i-th row is 1 if cj ∈ vi and 0 otherwise. In this way,
we obtain an m × n matrix. Permuting the columns of this matrix so that 1s form an
interval in each row is equivalent to permuting candidates so that the set of candidates
approved by each voter forms an interval. For CEI, we combine the matrix for CI with
its complement, i.e., we add a second row for each vote vi, so that the j-the entry
of that row is 0 of cj ∈ vi and 1 otherwise. A column permutation of the resulting
m × 2n matrix such that 1s form an interval in each row corresponds to permuting
candidates so that for each voter both the set of her approved candidates and the set of
her disapproved candidates form an interval; this is equivalent to the CEI property. For
VI it suffices to transpose the matrix constructed for CI, and for VEI this matrix has to
be combined with its complement.
For WSC, Elkind et al. (2015) provide an algorithm that works for any weak orders
(not just dichotomous ones). They leave the complexity of detecting PSC and SSC as
an open problem, and we have not been able to resolve it for dichotomous weak orders.
The problem of recognizing DUE preferences has recently been shown to be solvable
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in polynomial time by Nederlof and Woeginger (2015) via a connection to bipartite
permutation graphs.
4 Algorithms for Committee Selection
In this section, we consider two classic approval-based committee selection rules—
Proportional Approval Voting (PAV ) and Maximin Approval Voting (MAV )—and ar-
gue that we can design efficient algorithms for these rules when voters’ preferences
belong to some of the domains in our list (for some of the richer domains, we may
need to place mild additional restrictions on voters’ preferences).
We start by providing formal definitions of these rules.
Definition 1. Every non-increasing infinite sequence of non-negative reals w = (w1,
w2, . . . ) that satisfies w1 = 1 defines a committee selection rule w-PAV . This rule
takes a set of candidates C, a dichotomous profile P = (v1, . . . , vn) and a target
committee size k ≤ |C| as its input. For every size-k subset W of C, it computes its
w-PAV score as
∑
vi∈P uw(|W ∩ vi|), where uw(p) =
∑p
j=1 wj , and outputs a size-
k subset with the highest w-PAV score, breaking ties arbitrarily. The w-PAV rule
with w = (1, 12 ,
1
3 , . . . ) is usually referred to simply as the PAV rule, and we write
u(p) = 1 + · · ·+ 1p .
PAV is of particular interest since it is the only known approval-based committee se-
lection rule that satisfies the Extendend Justified Representation property (Aziz et al.,
2015b), which intuitively states that every large enough homogenous group has to be
represented in the committee. In what follows we assume that the entries of w are
rational and wi can be computed in time poly(i).
Definition 2. Given a set of candidates C, a dichotomous profile P = (v1, . . . , vn)
and a target committee size k ≤ |C|, the MAV -score of a size-k subset W of C is
computed as maxvi∈P(|W \ vi| + |vi \W |). MAV outputs a size-k subset with the
lowest MAV score, breaking ties arbitrarily.
The w-PAV rule is defined by Kilgour and Marshall (2012), see also (Kilgour,
2010). Intuitively, under this rule each voter is assumed to derive a utility of 1 from
having exactly one of his approved candidates in the winning set; his marginal utility
from having more of his approved candidates in the winning set is non-increasing. The
goal of the rule is to maximize the sum of players’ utilities. In contrast, MAV (Brams
et al., 2007) has an egalitarian objective: for each candidate committee, it computes
the dissatisfaction of the least happy voter, and outputs a committee that minimizes the
quantity.
Computing the winning committee under MAV and PAV is NP-hard, see, respec-
tively, (LeGrand et al., 2007) and (Skowron et al., 2015a; Aziz et al., 2015a). The
hardness result for PAV extends to w-PAV as long as w satisfies w1 > w2; more-
over, it holds even if each voter approves of at most two candidates or if each candidate
is approved by at most three voters.
We will now show thatPAV admits an algorithm whose running time is polynomial
in the number of voters and the number of candidates if the input profile satisfies CI
12
or VI and, furthermore, each voter approves at most s candidates or each candidate is
approved by at most d voters, where s and d are given constants. More specifically,
we prove that PAV winner determination for CI and VI preferences is in FPT with
respect to parameter s and in XP with respect to parameter d. For simplicity, we state
our results for PAV ; however, all of them can be extended to w-PAV .
In what follows, we write [x : y] to denote the set {z ∈ Z : x ≤ z ≤ y}.
Theorem 13. Given a dichotomous profile P = (v1, . . . , vn) over a candidate set
C = {c1, . . . , cm} and a target committee size k, if |vi| ≤ s for all vi ∈ P and P
satisfies VI, then we can find a winning committee under PAV in time O(22s · k · n).
Proof. Assume that P satisfies VI with respect to the order of voters v1 @ · · · @ vn.
For each triple (i, A, `), where i ∈ [1 : n], A ⊆ vi, and ` ∈ [0 : k], let r(i, A, `) be
the maximum utility that the first i voters can obtain from a committee W such that
W ∩ vi = A, |W | = `, and W ⊆ v1 ∪ . . . ∪ vi.
We have r(1, A, |A|) = u(|A|) for every A ⊆ v1 and r(1, A, `) = −∞ for every
A ⊆ v1, ` ∈ [0 : k] \ {|A|}. To compute r(i + 1, A, `) for i ∈ [1 : n − 1], A ⊆ vi+1
and ` ∈ [0 : k], we let p = |A \ vi| and set
r(i+ 1, A, `) = max
D⊆vi\vi+1
r(i,D ∪ (A ∩ vi), `− p) + u(|A|).
Indeed, every committee W with |W | = `, W ∩ vi+1 = A, W ⊆ v1 ∪ . . . ∪ vi+1
contains exactly ` − p candidates from v1 ∪ . . . ∪ vi and its intersection with vi is of
the form D ∪ (A ∩ vi), where candidates in D are approved by vi, but not vi+1. We
output maxA⊆vn r(n,A, k).
This dynamic program has n · 2s · (k + 1) states, and the value of each state is
computed using O(2s) arithmetic operations. Assuming that basic calculations take
constant time, we obtain a total runtime of O(22s · k · n).
A similar dynamic programming algorithm can be used if voters’ preferences sat-
isfy CI.
Theorem 14. Given a dichotomous profile P = (v1, . . . , vn) over a candidate set
C = {c1, . . . , cm} and a target committee size k, if |vi| ≤ s for all vi ∈ P and P
satisfies CI, then we can find a winning committee under PAV in time O(2s · n ·m).
Proof. Assume that P satisfies CI with respect to the order of candidates c1C · · ·Ccm.
For each triple (j, A, `), where j ∈ [1 : m], A ⊆ {cj−s+1, . . . , cj}, and ` ∈ [0 : k], let
r(j, A, `) be the maximum utility that voters can obtain from a committee W such that
W ⊆ {c1, . . . , cj}, W ∩ {cj−s+1, . . . , cj} = A, and |W | = `. Also, for each j ∈ [1 :
m−s+1] and each A ⊆ {cj , . . . , cj+s−1} let t(A, cj+s−1) =
∑
v∈P:cj+s−1∈v u(|A∩
v|). Note that all the quantities t(., .) can be computed in time O(2s ·m · n).
We have r(1, ∅, 0) = 0, r(1, {c1}, 1) = |{vi : c1 ∈ vi}|, and r(1, A, `) = −∞ if
(A, `) 6= (∅, 0), ({c1}, 1). The quantities r(j + 1, A, `) for j ∈ [1 : m− 1] can now be
computed as follows. If cj+1 6∈ A, we set
r(j + 1, A, `) = max {r(j, A, `), r(j, A ∪ {cj−s}, `)} .
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Now, suppose that cj+1 ∈ A. LetA′ = A\{cj+1}. Then r(j+1, A, `) = max{r1, r2}
where
r1 = r(j, A
′ ∪ {cj−s}, `− 1)− t(A′, cj+1) + t(A, cj+1),
r2 = r(j, A
′, `− 1)− t(A′, cj+1) + t(A, cj+1).
We output maxA⊆{cm−s+1,...,cm} r(m,A, k). Our dynamic program has at most 2
s ·m·
(k + 1) states, and the utility of each state can be computed in time O(1). Combining
this with the time used to compute t(., .), we obtain the desired bound on the running
time.
Our next two theorems also considers CI and VI preferences, and deal with the
case where no candidate is approved by too many voters. Just as the algorithms in
the proofs of Theorems 13 and 14, the algorithms for this case are based on dynamic
programming.
Theorem 15. Given a dichotomous profile P = (v1, . . . , vn) over a candidate set
C = {c1, . . . , cm} and a target committee size k, if |{i | c ∈ vi}| ≤ d for all
c ∈ C and P satisfies CI, then we can find a winning committee under PAV in time
poly(d,m, n, kd).
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that the candidate order c1 C · · · C cm wit-
nesses that P is CI. For each voter vi ∈ P , let cbi and cei be, respectively, the first and
the last candidate (with respect to C) approved by vi, i.e., vi = {cj | bi ≤ j ≤ ei}.
For j ∈ [1 : m], we say that a voter vi is active at j if bi ≤ j ≤ ei; we say that a voter
vi is finished at j if ei ≤ j. Let Bj = {vi | bi = j}, Ej = {vi | ei = j}. Given a set
W ⊆ C, we will refer to the quantity u(|W ∩ vi|) = 1+1/2+ · · ·+1/|W ∩ vi| as the
utility of voter i from set W . Throughout the proof, we make the standard assumption
that for any real-valued function f we have max{f(x) | x ∈ X} = −∞ when X = ∅.
Let R(j) be the set of all vectors r ∈ [0 : k]n such that for all ` ∈ [1 : n] it holds
that 0 ≤ r` ≤ min{j − b` + 1, k} and, moreover, r` = 0 whenever v` is not active
at cj . Vectors in R(j) can be used to describe the impact of a set of candidates C in
{c1, . . . , cj} with |C| ≤ k on voters who are active at cj : for each v` ∈ P , r` indicates
how many candidates in C are approved by v`. As there are at most d voters who are
active at j, we have |R(j)| ≤ (k + 1)d. For each j ∈ [1 : m], i ∈ [0 : min{j, k}]
and r ∈ R(j), let W(i, j, r) be the collection of all subsets of C with the following
properties: each W ∈ W(i, j, r) satisfies |W | = i, W ⊆ {c1, . . . , cj}, and, moreover,
for each ` ∈ [1 : n] such that v` is active at cj it holds that |v` ∩W | = r`. Intuitively,
W(i, j, r) consists of all size-i subsets of {c1, . . . , cj} whose impact on voters who are
active at cj is described by r. Let A(i, j, r) be the maximum total utility that voters
who are finished at j derive from a set in W(i, j, r); note that A(i, j, r) = −∞ if
W(i, j, r) = ∅. Clearly, it is easy to computeA(i, 1, r) for i ∈ {0, 1} and all r ∈ R(1).
We will now explain how to compute A(i, j, r) given the values of A(i′, j − 1, r′)
for all i′ ∈ [0 : min{j − 1, k}] and all r ∈ R(j − 1).
Suppose first that Bj 6= ∅. By definition of R(j) we have rx ∈ {0, 1} for each
vx ∈ Bj . Moreover, if we have rx 6= ry for some vx, vy ∈ Bj , then W(i, j, r) = ∅
and consequently A(i, j, r) = −∞: no subset of {c1, . . . , cj} can intersect vx, but not
vy or vice versa.
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Now, if Bj 6= ∅ and rx = 1 for all vx ∈ Bj , all sets inW(i, j, r) contain cj , and
therefore
A(i, j, r) = max
r′∈R′1
A(i− 1, j − 1, r′) +
∑
v`∈Ej
u(r`),
whereR′1 is the set of all vectors r
′ ∈ R(j−1) with r′` = r′`−1 for all voters v` that are
active at both cj and cj−1. Indeed, the second summand here is the total utility of voters
inEj ; for every such voter v` we know that for any set of candidatesW ∈ W(i, j, r) he
approves exactly r` candidates in W . The first summand is the maximum total utility
of voters who are finished at j − 1 that can be achieved by picking a set W ′ so that
W ′∪{cj} ∈ W(i, j, r); every such set W ′ is contained inW(i−1, j−1, r′) for some
vector r′ in R(j − 1) that is consistent with r, i.e. satisfies r′` = r′`− 1 for all voters v`
that are active at both cj and cj−1.
By a similar argument, if Bj 6= ∅ and rx = 0 for all vx ∈ Bj , no set inW(i, j, r)
contains cj , and therefore
A(i, j, r) = max
r′∈R′0
A(i, j − 1, r′) +
∑
v`∈Ej
u(r`),
where R′0 is the set of all vectors r
′ ∈ R(j − 1) with r′` = r′` for all voters v` that are
active at both cj and cj−1.
Finally, suppose that Bj = ∅. Then we have to consider both possibilities for cj .
To this end, define
a1 = max
r′∈R′1
A(i− 1, j − 1, r′) +
∑
v`∈Ej
u(r`),
a0 = max
r′∈R′0
A(i, j − 1, r′) +
∑
v`∈Ej
u(r`),
where R′1 and R
′
0 are defined as above, and set
A(i, j, r) = max{a1, a0},
again, the argument for correctness is the same as above.
To complete the proof, it remains to observe that the PAV -score of an optimal
size-k committee is given by maxr∈R(m)A(k,m, r). Once this score is computed, the
respective committee can be found using standard dynamic programming techniques.
To bound the running time, note that our dynamic program hasO(km(k+1)d) vari-
ables, and the argument above establishes that the value of A(i, j, r) can be computed
in timeO(d(k+1)d) given the values ofA(i′, j−1, r′) for all i′ ∈ [0 : min{k, j−1}],
r ∈ R(j − 1).
Theorem 16. Given a dichotomous profile P = (v1, . . . , vn) over a candidate set
C = {c1, . . . , cm} and a target committee size k, if |{i | c ∈ vi}| ≤ d for all
c ∈ C and P satisfies VI, then we can find a winning committee under PAV in time
poly(d,m, n, kd).
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Proof. Assume without loss of generality that the voter order v1 @ · · · @ vn witnesses
that (C, V ) is in VI. For each candidate cj ∈ C, let vbj and vej be, respectively, the
first and the last voter (with respect to @) who approve cj , i.e., {vi ∈ V | cj ∈ vi} =
{vi | bj ≤ i ≤ ej}. Let C`,r = {cj | bj = `, ej = r}, B` = {cj | bj ≤ `}. Given a set
W ⊆ C, we will refer to the quantity u(|W ∩ vi|) = 1+1/2+ · · ·+1/|W ∩ vi| as the
utility of voter i from set W . Throughout the proof, we make the standard assumption
that for any real-valued function f we have max{f(x) | x ∈ X} = −∞ when X = ∅.
Let N (i) be the set of all m-by-m matrices over [0 : k] that have the following
property: for every matrix N = (N`,r)`,r∈[1:m] ∈ N (i), we have 0 ≤ N`,r ≤ |C`,r| if
` ≤ i ≤ r and Nr,` = 0 if i < ` or i > r. Matrices inN (i) can be used to describe the
impact of a set of candidates W on voter vi: for each `, r ∈ [1 : m], N`,r indicates how
many candidates in W are approved by vi. Since cj ∈ vi implies i − d + 1 ≤ bj ≤ i,
i ≤ ej ≤ i+ d− 1, we have |N (i)| ≤ (k + 1)d2 .
For each j ∈ [0 : k], i ∈ [1 : n] and N ∈ N (i), let W(i, j,N) be the collection
of all size-j subsets of Bi such that vi ∩ C`,r = N`,r for all `, r ∈ [1 : m]; we set
W(i, j,N) = ∅ if j 6∈ [0 : k], i 6∈ [1 : n] or N 6∈ N (i). In words,W(i, j,N) consists
of all size-j sets consisting of candidates that are approved by at least one voter in
v1, . . . , vi whose impact on vi is described by N . Let A(i, j,N) be the maximum total
utility that voters in {v1, . . . , vi} derive from a set inW(i, j,N); note thatA(i, j,N) =
−∞ if W(i, j,N) = ∅. It is easy to compute A(1, j,N) for all j ∈ [0 : k] and all
N ∈ N (1): we have A(1, j,N) = u(j) if j = ∑r∈[1:m] n1,r and A(1, j,N) = −∞
otherwise. Also, for each i ∈ [1 : n] we have A(i, 0, N) = 0 if N`,r = 0 for all
`, r ∈ [1 : m] and A(i, 0, N) = −∞ otherwise.
We will now explain how to compute A(i, j,N) given the values of A(i−1, j′, N)
for all j′ ∈ [1, j] and all N ∈ N (i). Fix i ∈ [2 : n], j ∈ [0 : k], N ∈ N (i). Note first
that for any set W ∈ W(i, j,N) we have
|vi ∩W | =
∑
r,`∈[1:m]
nr,`;
also, if
∑
r,`∈[1:m] nr,` > j, thenW(i, j,N) = ∅.
Further, for every set W ∈ W(i, j,N) the set W \ {ct | bt = i} belongs to
W(i − 1, j′, N ′) for j′ = j − |{ct | bt = i}| and for some matrix N ′ ∈ N ′(i) with
n′`,r = n`,r for ` 6= i and r 6= i − 1. Let j′ = j − |{ct | bt = i}|, N ′ = {N ′ ∈
N (i− 1) | n′`,r = n`,r for ` 6= i, r 6= i− 1}. Then we have
A(i, j,N) = max
N ′∈N ′(i,N)
A(i− 1, j′, N ′) + u(
∑
r,`∈[1:m]
nr,`)
if
∑
r,`∈[1:m] nr,` ≤ j and A(i, j,N) = −∞ otherwise.
To complete the proof, it remains to observe that the PAV -score of an optimal size-
k committee is given by maxN∈N (n)A(n, k,N). Once this score is computed, the
respective committee can be found using standard dynamic programming techniques,
and the bound on running time follows immediately.
The reader may wonder if constraints on s and d in Theorems 13, 14 and 15 are
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necessary. We conjecture that the answer is yes, i.e., winner determination under PAV
remains hard under CI and VI preferences.
Conjecture 17. PAV is NP-hard even for CI and VI preferences.
However, for “truncated” weight vectorsw we can findw-PAV winners in polyno-
mial time. As the (1, 0, . . . )-PAV rule is essentially the classic Chamberlin–Courant
rule (Chamberlin and Courant, 1983) for dichotomous preferences, our next result can
be seen as an extension of the results of (Betzler et al., 2013) and (Skowron et al.,
2015b) for the Chamberlin–Courant rule and single-peaked and single-crossing prefer-
ences: while we work on a less expressive domain (dichotomous preferences vs. total
orders), we can handle a larger class of rules (all weight vectors with a constant number
of non-zero entries rather than just (1, 0, . . . , )).
Theorem 18. Consider a weight vector w where wi = 0 for i > i0 for some constant
i0. Then given a dichotomous profile P = (v1, . . . , vn) over a candidate set C =
{c1, . . . , cm} and a target committee size k, if P satisfies VI, we can find a winning
committee under w-PAV in polynomial time.
Proof. Assume that P satisfies VI with respect to the order of voters v1 @ · · · @ vn.
The following algorithm is a refinement of Theorem 13. For each triple (i, A, `),
where i ∈ [1 : n], A ⊆ vi, and ` ∈ [0 : k], let r(i, A, `) be the maximum utility that the
first i voters can obtain from a committee W such that |W | = `, and W ⊆ v1∪ . . .∪vi
and A ⊆W .
We have r(1, A, `) = u(`) for every ` ∈ [0 : |v1|] and A ⊆ v1 with |A| =
min(i0, `). In addition, we have r(1, A, `) = −∞ for every other A ⊆ v1 and ` ∈
[0 : k]. To compute r(i + 1, A, `) for i ∈ [1 : n − 1], A ⊆ vi+1 with |A| ≤ i0 and
` ∈ [|A| : k], we let s = |vi+1 \ (vi ∪A)|, i.e., the maximal number of candidates that
might have been added in the i + 1st step to the committee but that do not show up in
A, and set
r(i+ 1, A, `) = max r(i,D ∪ (A ∩ vi), `− |A| − r) + u(|A|),
where the maximum is taken over all D ⊆ vi \ vi+1 with |D| ∈ [0 : i0 − |A ∩ vi|] and
all r ∈ [0 : s].
This dynamic program has n ·mi0 · (k + 1) states, and the value of each state is
computed using O(mi0 + 1) arithmetic operations. Assuming that basic calculations
take constant time, we obtain a total runtime ofO(n ·m2i0+1 ·k), which is polynomial
for constant i0.
Theorem 19. Consider a weight vector w where wi = 0 for i > i0 for some constant
i0. Then given a dichotomous profile P = (v1, . . . , vn) over a candidate set C =
{c1, . . . , cm} and a target committee size k, if P satisfies CI, we can find a winning
committee under w-PAV in polynomial time.
Proof. Assume that P satisfies CI with respect to the order of candidates c1C · · ·Ccm.
The following algorithm is a refinement of Theorem 14. For two sets C1, C2 ⊆ C we
write C1 C C2 to denote that for all c ∈ C1 and d ∈ C2 it holds that c C d. For
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each triple (j, A, `), where j ∈ [1 : m], A ⊆ {c1, . . . , cj}, |A| ≤ i0 and ` ∈ [0 : k],
let r(j, A, `) be the maximum utility that voters can obtain from a committee W such
that A ⊆ W , |W | = ` and W \ A C A. Also, for each j ∈ [1 : m − s + 1] and
each A ⊆ {cj , . . . , cj+s−1} let t(A, c) =
∑
v∈P:c∈v u(|A ∩ v|). It is essential that,
given a committee W satisfying the conditions above, t(W, c) = t(A, c) assuming CI
preferences and c′Cc for all c′ ∈ A\{c}. Furthermore, note that all the quantities t(., .)
can be computed in time O(n ·mi0+1) since we assume that u(.) can be computed in
constant time.
We have r(1, ∅, 0) = 0, r(1, {c1}, 1) = |{vi : c1 ∈ vi}|, and r(1, A, `) = −∞
if (A, `) 6= (∅, 0), ({c1}, 1). The quantities r(j + 1, A, `) for j ∈ [1 : m − 1] and
A ⊆ {c1, . . . , cj+1} with |A| ≤ i0 can now be computed as follows. If cj+1 6∈ A, we
set
r(j + 1, A, `) = r(j, A, `).
Now, suppose that cj+1 ∈ A. LetA′ = A\{cj+1}. Then r(j+1, A, `) = max{r1, r2}−
t(A′, cj+1) + t(A, cj+1) where
r1 = max
c∈C with {c}CA
r(j, A′ ∪ {c}, `− 1),
r2 = r(j, A
′, `− 1).
We output maxA⊆C with |A|≤i0 r(m,A, k). Our dynamic program has at most m
i0+1 ·
(k+1) states, and the utility of each state can be computed in time O(m). Combining
this with the time used to compute t(., .), we obtain a total runtime ofO(n ·mi0+1 ·k),
which is polynomial for fixed i0.
Moreover, for the more restricted domains, such as VEI, CEI, WSC and PART we
can design polynomial-time algorithms for both MAV and PAV , under no additional
constraints on preferences (again, our results extend to w-PAV ).
Theorem 20. Given a dichotomous profile P = (v1, . . . , vn) over a candidate set
C = {c1, . . . , cm} and a target committee size k, if P satisfies VEI, we can find a
winning committee under MAV and PAV in polynomial time.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that P satisfies VEI for voter order v1 @
· · · @ vn. Each candidate in C belongs to one of the following four groups: C1 =
v1∩ vn, C2 = v1 \ vn, C3 = vn \ v1, and C4 = v1∩ vn; candidates in C1 are approved
by all voters and candidates in C4 are not approved by any of the voters.
Suppose first that |C1 ∪ C2 ∪ C3| < k. Then there exists an optimal committee
for both PAV and MAV that contains all candidates in C1 ∪ C2 ∪ C3 and exactly
k− |C1 ∪C2 ∪C3| candidates from C4. Hence, we can now assume that this is not the
case. Then there exist an optimal committee that contains no candidates from C4.
Now, if |C1| ≥ k, an optimal committee for both PAV and MAV consists of k
candidates from C1, and if |C1| < k, there exists an optimal committee that contains
all candidates in C1. It remains to decide how to allocate the remaining places among
candidates inC2 andC3. To do so, we observe that there is a natural ordering over each
of these sets: given a pair of candidates (c, c′) in C2 ×C2 or C3 ×C3, we write c ≤ c′
if {i : c ∈ vi} ⊆ {i : c′ ∈ vi}. Note that every two candidates in C2 are comparable
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with respect to ≤, and so are every two candidates in C3. It is now easy to see that
there exists an optimal committee (for PAV or MAV ) that consists of candidates in
C1, top p candidates in C2 with respect to ≤ and top r candidates in C3 with respect to
≤ for some non-negative values of p, r with p+ r+ |C1| = k. Thus, by considering at
most k2 possibilities for p and r, we can find an optimal committee.
For CEI, we employ a dynamic programing algorithm, somewhat similar to the one
used in Theorem 14. Since we consider a more constrained preferences (CEI instead
of CI), we do not require to maintain an exponential number of states.
Theorem 21. Given a dichotomous profile P = (v1, . . . , vn) over a candidate set
C = {c1, . . . , cm} and a target committee size k, if P satisfies CEI, we can find a
winning committee under MAV and PAV in polynomial time.
Proof. Assume thatP satisfies CEI with respect to the order of candidates c1C· · ·Ccm.
Let us consider PAV. For j ∈ [1 : m], let Vj denote all votes v ∈ P such that cj is the
rightmost approved candidate of v if c1 ∈ v and cj is the leftmost approved candidate
of v if c1 /∈ v. States are identified by a pair (j, `), where j ∈ [1 : m] and ` ∈ [0 : k].
Let r(j, `) be the maximum utility that the voters V1 ∪ · · · ∪ Vj can obtain from a
committee W with |W | = k such that |W ∩ {c1, . . . , cj}| = `, i.e., W contains `
candidates to the left of cj (including cj) and k− ` candidates to the strictly to the right
of cj .
We have r(1, 0) = 0 and r(1, 1) = |V1|, since V1 contains exactly those votes that
approve only c1. For j ∈ [1 : m] and ` ∈ [0 : k] we have r(j, `) = −∞ if ` > j or if
k−` > m−j. The remaining quantities r(j+1, `) for j ∈ [1 : m−1] can be computed
as follows: Let V −j+1 = {v ∈ Vj+1 : cj ∈ v} and V +j+1 = {v ∈ Vj+1 : cj /∈ v}. The
quantity r(j + 1, `) = max(r1, r2), where
r1 = r(j, `) +
∑
v∈V −j+1
u(`) +
∑
v∈V +j+1
u(k − `) and
r2 = r(j, `− 1) +
∑
v∈V −j+1
u(`) +
∑
v∈V +j+1
u(k − `+ 1).
Here, r1 corresponds to committees that do not contain cj+1 and r2 to committees that
contain cj+1. We output r(m, k). These quantities can be computed in polynomial
time.
For MAV we use a similar approach. For j ∈ [1 : m] and ` ∈ [0 : k], let g(j, `) be
the minimum MAV-score obtainable by the voters in V1∪· · ·∪Vj from a committeeW
with |W | = k such that |W ∩{c1, . . . , cj}| = `. Recall that V1 contains only votes that
approve c1; hence we have g(1, 0) = 0, g(1, 1) = 1 if |V1| ≥ 1 and g(1, 0) = 1 and
g(1, 1) = 0 if V1 = ∅. For j ∈ [1 : m] and ` ∈ [0 : k]we have g(j, `) =∞ if ` > j or if
k−` > m−j. The remaining quantities g(j+1, `) for j ∈ [1 : m−1] can be computed
as follows: Observe that for v ∈ V −j+1 and a committee W with |W | = k such that
|W ∩{c1, . . . , cj}| = `, |W \v|+ |v \W | = (j+1−`)+(k−`) = j+1+k−2`. For
v ∈ V +j+1, it holds that |W \v|+|v\W | = (m−j−1−k+`)+(`) = m−(j+1+k−2`)
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if cj+1 /∈ v and |W \v|+|v\W | = (m−j−1−k+`−1)+(`−1) = m−(j+3+k−2`)
if cj+1 ∈ v. The quantity g(j + 1, `) = min{g1, g2}, where
g1 = max{r(j, `), j+1+k−2`,m−(j+1+k−2`)} and
g2 = max{r(j, `−1), j+1+k−2`,m−(j+3+k−2`)}.
As before, g1 corresponds to committees that do not contain cj+1 and g2 to committees
that contain cj+1. We output g(m, k).
Proposition 22. Given a dichotomous profile P = (v1, . . . , vn) over a candidate set
C = {c1, . . . , cm} and a target committee size k, if P satisfies WSC or PART, we can
find a winning committee under MAV and PAV in polynomial time.
Proof sketch. For WSC, we can use the characterization in Lemma 1; the problem
then boils down to deciding how many candidates to select from each of the sets u \w,
u ∩ w and w \ u. For PART and PAV , we can show that an optimal committee can
be found by a natural greedy algorithm that at each point selects the candidate with
the largest “marginal contribution” to the total utility. For PART and MAV , we check,
for each t = 0, . . . , n, whether there exists a committee whose MAV -score is at most
t. This is the case if for each voter v ∈ P we can select at least (|v| + k − t)/2
candidates from v. Thus, if v1, . . . , v` are the distinct votes in P , we need to check that∑`
i=1 |vi| ≤ `t− (`− 2)k.
5 Conclusions and Open Problems
We have initiated research on analogues of the notions of single-peakedness and single-
crossingness for dichotomous preference domains. We have proposed many constraints
that capture some aspects of what it means for dichotomous preferences to be single-
dimensional, explored the relationship among them, and showed that these constraints
can be useful for identifying efficiently solvable special cases of hard voting problems
on dichotomous domains. The algorithmic results in Section 4 can be seen as a proof
that our approach has merit; however, there is certainly room for improvement there,
both in terms of removing restrictions on the sizes of approval sets and number of voters
that approve each candidate (for PAV ) and in terms of considering larger domains,
such as PSC for PAV and CI/VI for MAV .
For many of our constraints, we have provided efficient algorithms for check-
ing whether a given dichotomous profile satisfies that constraint; only checking of
PSC/SSC remains as an open case. We can also ask if it is possible to detect if a
given dichotomous profile is close to satisfying a structural constraint, and whether
such “almost-structured” profiles have useful algorithmic properties; similar issues for
profiles of total orders have recently received a lot of attention in the literature (Cornaz
et al., 2012, 2013; Bredereck et al., 2013; Erde´lyi et al., 2013; Elkind and Lackner,
2014; Faliszewski et al., 2014).
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